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Dutch economy integrating the earlier FREIA and KOMPAS models; Over de 
beheersbaarheid van de geldhoeveelheid by S.C.W. Eijffinger (1986), 
which is innovative in that a monthly monetary model is constructed; 
and Den Butter (1986), a study of the implications of alternative model 
specifications, applied to the Netherlands. 
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II. AM EXTREMELY SUCCINCT HISTORY OF THE SUBJECT 
1. The transmission mechanism of monetary impulses 
Arguably the roots of present-day monetary theory go back to the quant-
ity theory of money. The quantity theory in its turn can be seen as a 
reaction to, on the one side, the mercantilist inclination to identify 
wealth with money and, on the other side, the experiments of John Law, 
in whose opinion a large quantity of money was a great help in attain-
ing wealth (this section draws heavily on Visser 1974 ch. 5 and 1980 
ch. 5). It was predominantly within the fraraework of the quantity 
theory that economists began systematically to pay attention to the 
transmission mechanisms of monetary impulses, still a central theme in 
monetary theory. The quantity theory says that a change in the money 
supply eeteris paribus results in a proportional change in the price 
level. The interesting question of course is how this result comes 
about. In the theoretical sphere, it is not so much the comparative 
staties that is of interest (whether the ceteris paribus condition 
holds in a given situation is a matter of empirical verification, or 
should one say beliefs), but the dynamics of the impact of monetary 
impulses on prices and quantities. 
The most influential early publication expounding the way in which 
changes in the money supply influence the real sphere of the economy 
was David Hume's 1752 essay Of Money (Hume 1955). Hume describes a 
direct mechanism: an increased volume of money induces economie agents 
to increase their spending on goods. The impact is first feit in a 
higher level of economie activity. Little by little the price level 
rises and economie activity falls back to its original level, until in 
the end it's only prices that are higher as a result of the monetary 
impulse. 
There's also another mechanism: banks can keep the rate of interest 
below the level at which savings equal investment. This leads to higher 
borrowing and more spending. In this case an indirect mechanism, work-
ing via the rate of interest, drives up expenditure. The most elaborate 
exposition of this mechanism is Knut Wicksell's Geldzins und Güter-
preise (Wicksell 1898), but it had been expounded nearly a century 
before by the great Henry Thornton (1978 pp. 253-*5) and soon after by 
David Ricardo (1965 ch. 27) and Thomas Joplin (cf. Humphrey 1986). 
Strictly speaking, this is not a transmission mechanism of a monetary 
impulse, however. It's the rate of interest that starts things moving, 
not the money supply, though the volume of money increases in the 
process as the banks step "up their lending. But a monetary impulse 
proper may also be transmitted via the indirect mechanism. Increased 
cash balances will not only be spent on goods but on financial assets 
6 
as weil. The prices of financial assets are driven up and the rate of 
interest falls, which acts as a spur to spending. 
It might be thought that, if a positive monetary impulse is linked 
with a low rate of interest, a high rate of interest is an indication 
of a negative monetary impulse. This is not necessarily so, however. If 
a continuing positive monetary impulse leads to inflation, the nominal 
rate of interest will display a tendency to rise in step with the rate 
of inflation. If it lags behind, that in itself can be seen as a spend-
ing impulse via the indirect mechanism. It was again Henry Thornton who 
developed this idea, in a speech before the House of Commons in 1811 
(Thornton 1978 pp. 335-'6), though Irving Fisher is generally thought 
of as its originator {Fisher 1930) . Fisher also took pains to explore 
the ways in which inflation increases the velocity of money, which 
gives a further momentum to the inflationary process {Fisher 1963 ch. 
4). It may be noted in passing that, unlike what many textbook writers 
assert, Fisher was far from assuming an institutionally determined 
quasi-fixed velocity of money in the short term. 
2. Keynes, the neoclassical synthesis, and Leijonhufvud 
With Keynes it is only the indirect mechahism that works. He took issue 
with the neoclassical idea of a self-regulating economie system in 
which the price mechanism sees to it that .the effects of a disturbance 
are rapidly neutralized. In nis view, the price mechanism does not work 
that fast, which is as well, because that would in itself create diffi-
culties. 
In principle the direct and indirect mechanisms cannot only be set in 
motion by an increase in the nominal money supply, but also by a de-
crease in the overall price levél. In both cases real cash balances 
increase, and that is what counts. If aggregate demand diminishes - in 
textbook terms: the IS-curve shifts to the left - and wages and prices 
fall as a result, fuil employment could only be restored if the in-
creased real balances would drive the rate of interest down to the 
full-employment equilibrium rate, i.e. Wicksells natural rate or 
Keynes's neutral rate of interest (cf. Keynes 1961 p. 253). The LM-
curve shifts to the right, resulting in a downward movement of the rate 
of interest, known as the Keynes effect. This process itself is fraught 
with difficulties, because of the liquidity trap, on which Keynes's 
General Theory is a bit confusing. On the one hand, Keynes plays down 
the significance of what he calls virtually absolute liquidity pref-
erence (Keynes 1961 p. 207). On the other hand, he writes that the rate 
of interest "may fluctuate for decades about a level which is chronic-
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(Keynes 1961 p. 155). 
The neoclassical synthesis has since been undermined by Leijonhufvud 
who, building on Clower's 'dual decision hypothesis', has argued that 
one cannot make sense of Keynes within a model where Walrasian tatonne-
ment pricing is assumed. The dual decision hypothesis says that econ-
omie agents may draw up 'notional' buying and selling plans on the 
assumption that all sales and purchases will be decided upon in one 
all-embracing, simultaneous decision process, such that nobody need 
take account of the possibility that sales or purchase plans cannot be 
effeetuated, i.e., a tatonnement process. In actual practice, demand 
may be constrained by the possibility that sales plans cannot be ef-
fectuated (Clower 1961). The typically Keynesian notions mentioned 
above only make sense if we drop the assumption of simultaneous, all-
embracing tatonnement pricing. In Clower's footsteps Leijonhufvud has 
pointed to the assumption of the omniscient Walrasian auctioneer, who 
conducts the tatonnement process, as the essential difference between 
Keynes and the neoclassics (Leijonhufvud 1968,1969). In the neoclassic-
al approach, economie agents have fuil information on the supply and 
demand functions of other economie agents, through the activities of 
the auctioneer. With Keynes they are groping in the dark {it is a bit 
ironical that tatonnement, a term used to indicate fuil information, 
itself means groping). 
Developing the idea of imperfect information, Okun has made a dis-
tinction between 'auction markets' and 'customer markets' (Okun 1981 
ch. 4). Imperfect information makes price stickiness attractive to both 
buyers and sellers in customer markets, where costs associated with 
shopping are relatively high and price stickiness helps to reduce these 
costs, essentially information costs. Similar ideas, revolving around 
the idea of implicit contracts, have been developed for the labour 
market (cf. Okun 1981 chs 2,3). This approach has not yet led to a 
coherent and satisfactory theory of wage behaviour (cf. Van Hulst 1984 
pp. 44-'7). Wage theory, according to Thurow (1983 ch. 7, especially p. 
202) should take account of interdependent preferences, i.e., workers 
lose their motivation and work less hard if they feel that they are 
badly paid relative to other workers, which, incidentally, brings us 
back to ch. 2 of the General Theory. The upshot of the ongoing debate 
is that a certain degree of wage stickiness is advantageous for both 
employers and employees. 
3. Monetarism 
In the mid-1950s, when the Keynesian income-expenditure approach in its 
IS/LM-form had become the paradigm of mainstream economics, Milton 
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Friedman and nis associates launched an attack on it, aiming at a 
revival of the quantity theory of money (Friedman 1956) . Gradually it 
became clear that the difference between the so-called monetarists and 
Keynesians, or broadly income-expenditure (IS/LH) theorists, did not 
really concern the analytical framework but was rather about different 
views, or beliefs, on empirical matters (cf. Friedman 1970, 1971, 
Journal of Political Econortty 1972, Hayer 1975). A central tenet is that 
the private sector is inherently stable, in the sense that large fluc-
tuations in economie activity are seen as due to government policy, 
whilst the private sector absorbs shocks rather than causes them 
(Brunner 1970 pp. 5,6). Underlying this idea is the belief that mar-
kets, if left alone, will function quite satisfactorily. Given stabil-
ity of the private sector, i.e. a reasonably quick return to full 
employment after a shock, and a stable money demand function, it fol-
lows that a change in money supply growth can, after a transition pe-
riod, only affect the rate of inflation. 
The idea of an inherently stable"pfïvate sector may be unpalatable 
for many economists. Other elements stressed by monetarists are less 
controversial. Prominent among these is the monetarists' view of the 
transmission mechanism of monetary impulses. Monetarists argue that a 
change in the money supply affects the economy via a great variety of 
ways, in addition to the interest rate effect on investment emphasised 
in Standard Keynesian macroeconomics. An increase in the money supply 
disturbs the composition of asset holders' portfolios and gives rise to 
alï kinds of substitution effects. These occupy the center stage in 
monetarist analysis, wealth effects (amongst which the Pigou effect) 
being relegated to a'minor","-'thoü'gh not negfigibTë7"TöTe"~(rfï'edliiran" Ï969 
pp. 229-'31, Brunner 1971. Sprinkel 1971 pp. 32-'4). Siinilar sketches 
of the transmission mechanism can be found with professed non-moneta-
rists, notably Tobin, though for Tobin one link in the chain of effects 
is of paramount importance, se. the ratio of the (stock-) market valua-
tion of existing capital goods to the supply price of newly produced 
capital goods or q-ratio (Tobin 1971 chs 13,18). This ratio, which 
functions as a measure of the attractiveness of buying new capital 
goods, i.e., the attractiveness of investment, is widely used in empir-
ical studies of investment behaviour (Malkiel, Von Furstenberg and 
Watson 1979, Ciccolo and Fromm 1980, Heerkens 1983). 
The monetarists' view on the transmission mechanism may not be very 
controversial, their views on economie policy certainly are. With 
almost religious zeal they have preached the gospel of folJLpwing rules 
for monetary policy, as opposed to fine tuning (cf. Friedman- and Heller 
1968, Friedman 1986). This is because the lags in the transmission 
process of monetary impulses can be long and variable, in their view. 
Given the assumed stability of the private sector, discretionary macro-
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economie policy measures run the danger of working out pro-cyclically. 
The best the government (including the monetary authorities) can do is 
to keep the growth rate of the money supply within a small and pre-
announced band, in that way minimising the probability of any disturb-
ance arising, or its severity. 
Apart from the fact that such advice hinges on the stability of the 
money demand function (see on this ch. VII section 1), it can only be 
valid in large, relatively closed economies on a floating rate system. 
It has, furthermore, been brought up against the Honetarists that the 
money supply is not exogenous and that money is an elusive concept, 
what with financial innovations going apace (e.g., Kaldor 1982). Es-
sentially this is a repeat of the discussion following the publication 
of the Radcliffe Report back in 1959. The upshot of that discussion was 
that the money supply can to a large extent be exogenous, depending on 
the policy of the monetary authorities and, in a fixed-exchange-rate 
system, the interest elasticity of capital flows. Another conclusion 
was that financial innovations can, andL.ji.o-, frus.tr.a.t^ .mpne_t.acy,.-p,qlicy 
to a certain extent, but not completely (see for a discussion and 
references Visser 1974 pp. 46-50, 211-'4). 
Less controversial has been the Monetarists' emphasis on the longer 
term. Following Irving Fisher they argued that, in an inflationary 
process, interest rates will adjust to inflation. High nominal interest 
rates in such a situation are a result of high money growth, i.e. a lax 
monetary policy, rather than, as in textbook IS/LM-analysis, a result 
of tight monetary policy. 
This emphasis on the longer run, and its concomitant more systematic 
attention to expectations, also put paid to the Phillips-curve trade-
off between inflation and unemployment. The short-term Phillips-curve 
hinges on given inflation expectations. In the long run, expectations 
will adjust to inflation and the Phillips curve is perpendicular at the 
so-called 'natural rate of unemployment' (NRU), dubbed non-inflationary 
rate of unemployment (NIRU) or non-accelerating-inflation rate of 
unemployment (NAIRU) by economists who take exception to the ideo-
logical undertones of the adjective 'natural'. 
Even if the idea of an essentially vertical long-term Phillips curve 
is by and large acceptable to non-Monetarists, there is a fundamental 
difference in that Monetarists believe that the economy is a self-
equilibrating mechanism, whilst others do not necessarily believe such 
a thing. The economy will, in the view of Monetarists, after a shock 
which drives it off the long-term Phillips curve, automatically return 
to it within a relatively short period of time. Others may believe that 
the economy may stay to the right of the long-term Phillips curve after 
a deflationary shock for a considerable period if no stabilisation 
measures are taken by the government. Economists of all persuasions 
wi'11 by now be agreed that any attempts to reduce_jmgmp_loyment b.elow_ __ 
NRU or WIRU through monetary and/orjy.jcjil_p©iiere3T^ 
-jïf7EftgT^)-~±rf^^ to say that NRU or WIRU itself 
cannot be reduced. Any positive NRU or NIRU is a reflection of imperf-
ect information and adjustment costs and/or a minimum wage level above 
the value of the marginal product of some kinds of labour. It follows 
that the government can reduce NRU or NIRU to the extent that it can 
improve information and help to reduce adjustment costs, including the 
costs of retraining. 
III. CROWDING OUT 
The Monetarists rejected 'fine tuning', i.e. discretionary or activist 
macro-economie policies designed to stabilise the economy. In their 
eyes, not only monetary policy is of little help to this end, fiscal 
policy won't do the job either. Expansionary fiscal policies will, 
given the money supply, to a large extent crowd out private expendit-
ure. 
It stands to reason that in a near-full-employment economy any expan-
sion of real government expenditure can only occur at the expense of 
real private expenditure, i.e., there is real crowding out. In the 
IS/LH-diagram, a positive fiscal impulse shifts the IS-curve to the 
right, beyond the full-employment point. The ensuing rise in the price 
level makes the LM-curve and, through substitution and wealth effects, 
the IS-curve as well, shift to the l.eft. 
There wiïï~be nominal crowding out as well, so the argument runs: a 
positive fiscal impulse will increase nominal GNP by a lower amount, if 
at all. Various mechanisms can account for this phenomenon. First of 
all, with a vertical LM-curve a fiscal impulse will shift the IS-curve, 
with a change in the rate of interest as the only result. With an 
upward-sloping LM-curve, partial crowding out may occur. Apart from 
these rather trivial cases, there are other channels, which are more 
interesting from a theoretical point of view. One such channel is that 
an increasing volume of government debt in the hands of the public may 
be taken as an increase in wealth, resulting both in higher money 
demand (a shift of the LM-curve to the left) and higher expenditure (a 
shift of the IS-curve to the right). The outcome is uncertain. Further-
more, an increasing volume of government debt in the public's port-
folios shifts the LM-curve upward (Hahn 1980 p. 11, Visser 1980 p. 
290). This is often neglected in the literature, possibly because in 
IS/LM-analysis the credit market is usually not explicitly taken 
account of. The LM-curve, however, represents the equilibrium conditons 
in the market given the volume of debt. With a change in..._the. volume of 
debt, the rate of interest that ensures portfolio balance at any given 
level of income, has to change. This effect may be called portfolio 
crowding-out. It has been argued that for crowding out to occur in this 
way, bonds and real capital must be closer substitutes than bonds and 
money. If bonds and money are close substitutes, an increase in the 
bond volume will, for reasons of portfolio composition, drive up the 
price of existing capital (Buiter 1985 p. 47, Tobin 1971 p. 225). This 
means that Tobin's q-ratio increases, i.e., the required rate of return 
on capital falls (see above, ch. II, section 3). There may then be a 
small upward movement of the LM-curve, but this is outweighed by an 
increased attractiveness of investment, which translates into a shift 
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to the right of the IS-curve. 
Yet another channel is ex-ante crowding out, i.e., crowding out 
without a jBre.Cja.din.g_xla.e_dn...tii.e. r.at.e. ofL_int.er.est as in....the previous 
cases, because of ultra-rationality. David and Scadding (1974), who 
introduced the idea, studied the savings ratio in the United States 
over a 70-year period. They were struck by the fact that savings, 
including expenditure on consumer durables, were by and large constant 
over that period as a percentage of GNP, defined as including the impu-
ted annual gross rental flow on consumer durables. This constancy 
occurred despite changes in the share of output absorbed by the public 
sector. They sought to explain this phenomenon by the assumption of 
ultra-rationality. This nieans that private economie agents consider 
both taxes and private consumption and private and public investment as 
(near-)perfect substitutes. When the government, e.g., provides a~ 
service, such as schooling or medical care, financed by taxes, that 
takes the place of privately bought services. Private agents lower 
their spending and the overall savings ratio does not change. 
Finally, there is the Ricardian equivalence theorem (discussed by 
Buchanan 1976, Tobin 1980 ch. III), which might better be called the 
pre-Ricardian equivalence theorem (cf. 0'Driscoll 1977, Feldstein 
1982). This is another case of ex-ante crowding out, which results from 
full tax discounting: government debt is not seen as net wealth of the 
private sector, because private agents take account of the future 
burden of taxes that will be levied to pay interest and amörtisation 
(cf. Barro 1974). Private agents will increase their savings in order 
to provide for these future taxes and the increase in government spend-
ing is offset by a decrease in private spending. 
Émpirical tests are hot very encouraging for the idea of ex-ante 
crowding out (Feldstein 1982), though there is a certain plausibility 
in the notion that tax-financed education or medical care will reduce 
private expenditure on these items by more or less the same amount. 
IS/LM models can be augmented with an equation for the government 
budget deficit. Such augmented models can be used to study the behavi-
our of the system when the government budget is not in equilibrium and 
either the money supply or the volume or government bonds is changing 
(cf. Blinder and Solow 1974). Wealth effects and interest rate effects 
move the system to a new equilibrium, if such an equilibrium exists, 
which may not be the case (Infante and Stein 1976, Buiter 1985). This 
kind of analysis can be extended to economies that are growing or have 
targets for the current account of the balance of payments or both (Van 
Ewijk 1986). 
IV. NEW CLASSICAL MACROECONOMICS 
The message of the Monetarists was that activist countercyclical macro-
economie policies do, if anything, more harm than good. New Classical 
Macroeconomics (NCME), or Monetarism Mark II as Tobin (1980 p. xiii) 
dubbed it, goes one step further and denies any systematic short-term 
impact of macroeconomic stabilisation'^öTïcTeïr~" 
NCME combines rational expectations in the sense of Muth with contin-
uously clearing markets. Muth's hypothesis was that "expectations of 
firms (or, more generally, the subjective probability distribution of 
outcomes) tend to be distributed, for the same information set, about 
the prediction of the theory (or the 'objective' probability distribut-
ion of outcomes)" (Muth 1961 p. 316). Expectations, in other words, 
"are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economie 
theory". Expectations may prove far off the mark. Errors are, however, 
not serially correlated, as is the case with adaptive expectations 
which so often were assumed in empirical studies on inflation and 
interest rates and which underlaid the Monetarists' view of the Phil-
lips curve. 
The policy ineffectiveness proposition is usually derived from a 
model containing a supply function that allows for deviations of actual 
production from its 'natural' or NRU- level if actual prices diverge 
from expected prices (Sargent and Wallace 1975, Minford and Peel 1981). 
Price level shocks are first taken for relative price changes, which 
leads suppliers to change the volume they offer. Economie agênts are 
price takers. Essentially price förmati'oh is of the Walrasian variety, 
though information is not complete and immediate. A Walrasian equili-
brium system of equations grinds out a unique equilibrium level of 
employment, which corresponds to a unique equilibrium level of output. 
It is not possible to reduce unemployment below NRU other than by 
engineering a surprise price shock, which would be suboptimal from a 
social welfare point of view anyway. Government policy measures which 
follow a rule are impotent, because the public will soon enough know 
the rule. Still, it has been shown that slight raodifications to the 
basic model suffice to undermine the policy-ineffectiveness proposit-
ion. In some models stabilisation policies can reduce the variance of 
output (Minford and Peel 1981, Asako 1982, Dickinson, Driscoll and Ford 
1982) and, if we assume non-linearities in the supply function, even 
influence the average level of output (Shiller 1978). 
All kinds of objections can be brought up against NCME. The most 
fundamental one arguably is that NCME assumes away all the real-life 
problems that could provide a case for stabilisation policies. In an 
all-embracing Walrasian market system with full price flexibility and 
economie agents acting as price takers, underutilization of resources 
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actual prices out of line with expected prices in an NCME approach, 
whilst it distorts relative prices, above all interest rates, with the 
Austrians. 
It is often argued that Monetarists and NCME adherents on one side 
and Austrians on the other should not be lumped together. Austrians 
are, correctly, said t.o emphasise microeconomic processes and to have 
little time for aggregative analysis (Haberler 1963 pp. 33-67, Hayek 
1967, Reekie 1984 pp. 66 ff.). Monetarists and NCME adherents purport-
edly neglect relative price changes following upon a monetary impulse. 
As far as the Monetarists are concerned, this argument seems mistaken 
(cf. Humphrey 1984). The idea is perhaps due to Friedman's example of a 
helicopter dropping dollar notes which are distributed over the members 
of the community in the same proportion as the existing cash balances 
(Friedman 1969 pp. 4-7). But Monetarists such as Bruriner and Meltzer 
have always gone to great pains to explain the transmission process of 
monetary impulses, and Friedman himself painted a similar picture {see 
Ch. II section 3 above). The differences between Austrians and NCME 
adherents seem to be larger than those between Austrians and Moneta-
rists (cf. on this subject Scheide 1986). NCME sees economie actors as 
having much, though not fuil, information. They live in a world of 
risk, not uncertainty (i.e., they can make an estimated guess of the 
probability distribution of the outcomes of a decision). Austrians, on 
the other hand, are in one respect much nearer to Keynes: they take the 
"dark forces of time and ignorance" seriously. . 
V. MICRO-FOUNDATIONS OF MONETARY THEORY 
Money and Banking textbooks have no difficulty explaining the use of 
money. Money facilitates the exchange of goods and the division of 
labour by lowering transaction costs. There is nothing wrong with that 
story, but when it comes to incorporating money in microeconomic gener-
al-equilibrium models, it proves extremely difficult to explain why 
people would be willing to hold a non-interest-bearing asset for trans-
action purposes and why the use of such an asset could lower transact-
ion costs. In the textbook story money does away with the need for a 
doublé coincidence of wants for a transaction to take place. More 
generally, the use of money reduces the transaction costs (in the guise 
of information costs) which a seller incurs to find a buyer and a buyer 
incurs to find a seller. Not surprisingly, in Arrow-Debreu models, 
where transaction decisions are taken at one moment for all future 
dates, money finds no place (cf. Debreu 1959). Arrow-Debreu and, for 
that matter, Walrasian equilibrium models with money are not very 
satisfactory because they provide no reason why goods shouldn't ex-
change directly for other goods (cf. Hahn 1973 p. 23). The Walrasian 
auctioneer who, or the tatonnement mechanism that, regulates the buying 
and selling process are devices expressly introduced to abstract from 
information costs, the very rationale of the use of money. Patinkin's 
attempt to integrate monetary and value theory in his painstakingly 
written Money, Interest, and Prices (Patinkin 1965), which can be seen 
as the culmination of the Walrasian tradition, is a glaring example of 
the ultimate futility of introducing money in a general-equilibrium 
model where all goods exchange against all goods. Patinkin tries to 
"conceive of a barter economy as the limiting position of a money 
economy whose nominal quantity of money is made smaller and smaller" 
(Patinkin 1965 p. 75). This attempt was doomed to failure, because 
prices fall in step with the nominal money supply and the real quantity 
of money is not reduced. Patinkin realised full well that one cannot 
compare a barter economy with a monetary economy in this way. His 
argument, however, was that "in a barter economy there is obviously 
neither an excess-demand equation for money nor a dependence of commod-
ity excess-demand equations on real balances (ibidem). No mention here 
of different exchange technologies in the two systems. 
A step forward was made by writers who constructed general-equili-
brium models with transaction costs, prominent amongst them Niehans 
(1969, 1971, 1975, 1978). These models leave the question unanswered 
why transactions which involve the use of money should be chêaper than 
transactions that do not. Brunner and Meltzer (1971) delve deeper into 
the nature of the transaction costs that are saved upon by the use of 
money. In their view, these transaction costs are, apart from costs of 
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transferring and storing (which can best be seen as production costs), 
in fact costs of acquiring information on assets. 
In actual practice the choice which confronts economie agents is not 
between autarchy and transactions in accordance with doublé coincidence 
of wants. There is also the possibility of a sequence of transactions. 
The costs of these transactions can be kept low by using some assets 
rather than others. Repeated use of some assets and some transaction 
sequences will lower the marginal cost of acquiring information. 
Stimulating though Brunner and Meltzer's analysis may be, it still 
leaves one somewhat in the dark about the nature of the information 
sought. A clue is given in a footnote, which says that "If there are no 
costs of acquiring information, differences in the timing of receipts 
and payments are adjusted by issuing verbal promises in exchange for 
goods and, later, delivering goods" (Brunner and Meltzer 1971 p. 785 
nt. 4). Though this idea was not taken up at the time, recent develop-
ments follow a similar track. E.g., Gale argues that in a world without 
a complete Arrow-Debreu system of markets, trading continues after the 
first date. The value of sales will not at êvery moment in time equal 
the value of purchases for all actors. Money holdings then serve to 
absorb the difference, at which point Gale, like Brunner and Meltzer 
before him, observes that "If agents were really trustworthy there 
would be no need for a sequence of budget constraints" {Gale 1982 p. 
186, see also pp. 197, 235, 245). Agents could, in other words, issue 
debt (IOU's). 
The point of trustworthiness is also stressed by Illing (1985). Even 
if agents were immortal, there would be no complete Arrow-Debreu system 
of contingent future markets, if only because of moral hazard problems 
which follow from asymmetrie information. The argument runs as follows. 
Households are at the start of every period supplied with endowments of 
perishable consumption goods. These endowments are risk variables, with 
a known probability distribution. Households could even out the fluctu-
ations in individual endowments by concluding insurance contracts. But 
there is asymmetrie information. At any moment in time, households know 
their own endowment. Others do not, i.e., the insurance company has to 
incur costs to collect information on individual endowments. There is, 
therefore, an incentive for households to cheat. It may in these circ-
umstances be advantageous to hold money as a substitute for costly 
insurance. But why, again, money rather than IOU's? Illing here follows 
Gale: because financial assets other than money imply information 
costs (Illing 1985 pp. 81-'2). One might object that such a model is 
far removed from reality, but such an objection would be beside the 
point. The aim is to find the essential or minimum requirements for a 
monetary economy, not to give realistic description of a monetary 
economy. One will not be surprised to find that a time duration and 
information costs are minimum requirements of a monetary economy, but 
it may be thought rather striking that uncertainty as to prices or 
interest rates, which looms large in Keynesian money demand functions, 
is not a necessary precondition. 
The last word has certainly not been said on this subject. Thare is 
no lack of fine ideas, but to model these ideas is no mean task. One 
thing at least is clear: timeless general-equilibrium models won't do. 
We need models that provide for sequences of trades. People like Gale 
and Illing are most probably on the right track. Information costs may 
well be the key to the use of money, as they also explain its typical 
characteristics of divisibility and liquidity, plus its power to lower 
transaction costs (cf. Gale 1982 pp. 187-'8, 194-'7). Having found the 
minimum requirements of a monetary economy, the next step should be to 
incorporate production in the model and to take account of the better 
specialization made possible by the use of money, which means that the 
endowments in monetary economies differ from those in barter economies 
{cf. Hahn 1973 p. 234). But this poses enormous technical problems. 
VI. COMPETING CURRENCIES 
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Apart from business-cycle theory, there is another subject where the 
resurgence of Austrianism is feit, se. the idea of competing curren-
cies. At first sight covering this idea of Hayek's adds a touch of the 
quixotic to this survey, but underlying Hayek's proposal are very 
serious considerations of social philosophy. Moreover, the discussion 
on competing currencies bears on the very topical issue of the viabil-
ity of the private use of the European Currency Unit or ECU. 
Hayek proposes to give private enterprises the right to issue their 
own money, not in the sense of commercial banks creating sterling or 
DMark or Kronor, but separate currencies in their own right (Hayek 
1978, 1979). Money is too important to leave its supply or the super-
vision on its supply to the government. Democratie government cannot be 
trusted not to tinker with the money supply in order to pursue short-
term ends. Democratically elected governments will do their utmost to 
get re-elected after having served their term. They are under a con-
stant temptation to abuse their power over the money supply in order 
to fulfil the demands of the groups in society whose support they 
think they need for their re-election. For a long time Hayek believed 
that a system of fixed exchange rates could provide the necessary 
discipline, but when his hopes were disappointed he swung to the other 
extreme. Not only will governments defraud people by satisfying the 
demands of interest groups via the printing press, the lack of monetary 
discipline may also be seen as the cause of the instability of market 
economies. 
The only way Hayek sees to prevent debasing of the currency is to 
introducé competition in its supply, just as with any other commodity. 
Governments need not give up their right to create money, they only 
need to give their monopoly. In a competitive system it will be in the 
interest of the issuers of money to create a currency with a more or 
less stable purchasing power, otherwise money users would switch over 
to the currencies provided by competitors. Competition provides a 
discipline which governments sorely lack. For Austrians, it is not only 
a technical matter. There's also a moral side to it: only governments 
can renege on debts by simply printing money (Barry 1981 p. 26).Thanks 
to their control over the money supply, governments can put themselves 
above the rules by which everybody else is bound, thus undermining the 
standards of conduct that hold societies together. 
Leaving aside other technicalities, one may ask whether 'good' or 
stable currencies will not be driven from the market by 'bad' or depre-
ciating currencies through the working of Gresham's Law. Hayek has 
pointed out, however, that Gresham's Law is only valid in situations 
with fixed exchange rates between the various currencies (Hayek 1978 p. 
38; Starbatty 1982). With variable exchange rates 'bad' money depre-
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VII. MONEY DEMAND 
1. Stability and instability 
One cornerstone of monetarist thinking nas been the stability of the 
money demand function. If money demand were not a stable function of a 
restricted number of variables, stabilisation of the growth rate of the 
money supply would be of little help in stabilising the real side of 
the economy. An enormous amount of research effort has gone into estim-
ating money demand functions, without any conclusive answers coming up 
as yet. Often, some specifications of the money demand function perform 
reasonably well for some countries and some periods, while others do 
for other countries or other periods (cf Andersen 1985, Den Butter and 
Fase 1981). Often, considerable instability is found, with financial 
innovations usually seen as the main culprit (cf Akhtar 1983, with a 
survey of empirical research, Judd and Scadding 1982, also with such a 
survey). Other causes of instability, or shifts, in the money demand 
function mentioned in the literature are institutional changes (caused 
by monetary policy measures) and changes in exchange rate regime 
(Boughton 1981). Only the Reserve Bank of St. Louis seems to cling to 
the idea of stability through thick and thin (Hafer and Hein 1979, 
Hafer 1984, Hafer 1985). Two other possible explanations have interest-
ing theoretical implications, which is why we pay special attention to 
them. The first one is the idea that the Walrasian money market may be 
out of equilibrium at any one moment, or, alternatively, there may be a 
temporary equilibrium not in consonance with the actual values of the 
arguments in the money demand function, thanks to buffer stocks. The 
other one is that the demand for foreign currency may impinge on the 
demand for domestic currency, a phenomenon known in the literature as 
currency substitution. 
2. Buffer stocks 
Given a situation of equilibrium in the Walrasian money market, a 
monetary impulse leads to excess demand or excess supply. Excess demand 
or excess supply means that adjustment processes will start that norm-
ally (on the theoretical plane) take place via the price mechanism. 
Economie actors will adjust their portfolios to the changed volume of 
money, which means that they will try to buy or sell other assets, in 
the process driving the prices of those assets up or down. There may be 
frictions in this process. Time and money are involved in adjusting 
one's portfolio and in gathering and processing the information needed 
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The relevance of the idea of buffer stocks, or quasi-equilibrium, or 
temporary equilibrium, for the money demand function is that instabil-
ity in money demand, found in econometrie research, need not really 
reflect unstable money demand(cf. Mahajan 1980). It may, instead, 
result from a monetary disturbance which is not iramediately resoived 
through the transmission process of monetary impulses. What looks like 
unstable demand may in fact be a case of delayed adjustment or, in 
Hines's approach, of anticipation of a change in expenditure. In the 
case of delayed adjustment thore must, in view of the supposed reason-
ably quick adjustment speeds in the financial sector, be a succession 
of supply shocks. Indeed, that is a solution suggested by Artis and 
Lewis to explain the apparent breakdown of the stability of money 
demand in the United Kingdom during the early nineteenseventies (Artis 
and Lewis 1974). 
3. Currency substitution 
The other explanation of the apparent instability of the money demand 
function mentioned above is currency substitution. This idea~," ~pfeached 
with unremitting zeal by R.I. McKinnon, implies instability in the 
demand for domestic currency, as foreign currency may act as a substit-
ute for domestic currency in economie agents' portfolios (e.g., McKin-
non 1979 Ch. 10, 1982, 1984). Currency substitution may either be 
direct or indirect. Direct currency substitution occurs when economie 
agents, e.g., expect a depreciation of their home currency and shift 
into foreign currency. McKinnon does not think this kind of currency 
substitution to be dominant, and empirical research does indeed give no 
reason to attach much weight to it (cf., e.g., Laney, Radcliffe and 
Willett 1984, Batten and Hafer 1984, Batten and Hafer 1985). McKinnon's 
argument hinges on indirect currency substitution. This takes place 
through capital movements. His reasoning is as follows. Let us assume 
that at a certain moment in time economie agents suddenly expect the 
home currency to depreciate. The international capital market is per-
fect and interest rates adjust to take account of the expected depre-
ciation. All this may happen without any capital flows actually taking 
place. But with the new, higher domestic interest rates portfolio 
balance is disturbed. Home residents want to move out of money and into 
bonds, in the process exerting downward pressure on the rate of inter-
est. In the rest of the world the converse happens, if the home country 
is big enough to influence interest rates abroad. The interest rate 
differential is in this way pushed below the value reflecting the 
expected depreciation. Consequently, it becomes attractive to buy 
foreign bonds. Capital exports occur until the domestic money supply is 
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reduced to the point where it is willingly held at the increased rate 
of interest, i.e., where portfolio balance is restored. In the rest of 
the world the money supply has risen and again is willingly held, at a 
reduced rate of interest. All this takes place at spot exchange rates 
that are held constant. McKinnon's message is indeed that exchange 
rates should be held constant. He further assumes that the world money 
demand function is stable in the sense that a stabilisation of world 
money supply growth results in a stabilisation of the world rate of 
inflation. In order to stabilise world money growth, the leading indus-
trial nations, the United States, Japan and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, should act together. They should, in particular, coordinate 
their domestic credit expansion. Liquidity inflows or outflows through 
the balance of payments should, moreover, not be sterilised. If one 
country sterilised, the world money supply would be affected (this is 
what happens in a key-currency system where international reserves are 
held in the form of interest-bearing debt of the key-currency country). 
If both countries sterilised, portfolio balance within a country might 
be precluded at the given rate of exchange, resulting in a continuous 
capital flow (see on sterilisation and the money supply in a two-
country model De Grauwe 1983). Depletion of foreign-exchange reserves 
and exhaustion of international credit will put an end to this and to 
stable exchange rates. Apart from the question of stable exchange 
rates, a stable growth of the world money supply is needed to prevent 
inflationary or deflationary pressures. 
McKinnon's proposal is intriguing, but one wonders if the relation-
ships stressed by him are crucial enough to make the system work in 
practice as envisaged by him. For one thing, it is doubtful if one can 
meaningfully speak of a world money demand function and, if so, whether 
it is as stable as McKinnon asserts (Spinelli 1983). For another, 
interest rate differentials between countries seem to reflect differen-
ces in rates of inflation rather than expected short-term exchange-rate 
movements (Goldstein and Haynes 1984). Furthermore, McKinnon somewhat 
off-handedly assumes that capital flows will accommodate any trade or 
current account imbalance without any problem. Be that as it may, the 
empirical evidence thus far does not corroborate McKinnon's explanation 
of money demand instability. But his attempt to spell out""TK"ë""pricon~dï-
tions for ^ xcïahgë-rate stability must be applauded. It must be noted, 
finally, that in McKinnon's analysis of indirect currency substitu-
tion, money demand is a stable function of the rate of interest. Money 
demand may be unstable, the money demand function is not. It is rajther 
the bond demand function that shifts. 
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building block introduces rational expectations and interest parities. 
Different inflation rates in different countries will result in differ-
ent nominal rates of interest. Under interest parity any difference in 
interest rates must be reflected in a premium or discount on forward 
exchange. With rational expectations the forward exchange rate will 
equal the expected future spot rate, with expectations based on (curr-
ent or expected) inflation rates. In this way all elements fit together 
very elegantly, but with highly restricted explanatory power. Empirical 
studies suggest that actual price and exchange rate movements have not 
fulfilled the conditions for PPP in the period with floating exchange 
rates beginning in 1973, or rather 1971, whatever the verdict on the 
preceding period with a fixed peg system may be (cf. Genberg 1978, 
Frenkel 1981, Frankel 1985). Even the Law of One Price, which says that 
similar traded goods have the same price, at ruling rates of exchange, 
in different countries, does not seem to be valid {cf. Spitailer 1980, 
De Roos 1981, Zeelenberg 1985 Ch. 4). Fulfilment of the Law of One 
Price is a necessary, though not a sufficiënt, condition for PPP to be 
valid. So non-fulfilment of the Law of One Price should be enough to 
put paid to PPP. On theoretical grounds PPP is suspect as well. Apart 
from index number problems, it is to be expected that, even if the Law 
of One Price were valid, price relationships between tradeables and 
non-tradeables diverge between countries (as explained by Balassa 
1964). This problem could only be overcome if prices of identical 
factors of production were the same everywhere, which means that PPP 
primarily has value as a theoretical model for thinking things through 
for the very long run {cf. De Roos 1985 pp. 28-'9). All this is not to 
deny that the simple form of the monetary approach to exchange rate 
determination can provide a useful fr.amework for explaining exchange 
rate movements in a short, confined period of time during hyperinfla-
tion (cf. Frenkel 1978). Nor can it be denied that in the longer term 
differences in inflation rates tend to be reflected in exchange-rate 
movements, even if there is no one-to-one relationship (cf. Officer 
1980). 
In the simple monetary approach to exchange rate determination, the 
rate of exchange is not determined by flows, as in the Keynesian inco-
me-expenditure (IS/LM) models, but by stocks of assets. This asset 
approach is not confined to the simple monetary model. Other models are 
based on the same idea. In portfolio models, which are useful to ex-
plain short-term exchange rate fluctuations where the influence of the 
current account can be neglected, the rate of exchange depends on the 
demand for foreign assets (bonds), given the supply of domestic money 
and domestic bonds. For explaining exchange rate movements in the 
longer term, the current account cannot be neglected. Full equilibrium 
can only exist when both the current account and the capital account 
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are in equilibrium. With fully floating exchange rates any disequi-
librium In the current account involves a disequilibrium in the capital 
account, adding to or subtracting from the stock of assets held by a 
country's residents and in that way influencing the rats of exchange. 
Building a model with both the capital account and the current account 
fully spelled out is far from simple, but there are a few examples 
(e.g., Dornbusch and Fischer 1980, see also Krueger 1983 ch. 5). 
One feature emphasised in recent work on exchange rates is the phenom-
enon of overshooting. After a change in the data of the system, the 
rate of exchange moves beyond its new equilibrium value, to revert to 
it later. Overshooting may go some way to explain the erratic movements 
of exchange rates after 1973. It results from slow adjustment on at 
least one market. In an IS/LM model it may result from slow adjustment 
of imports and exports to an exchange rate change. In order for a 
depreciation to improve the current account it may in consequence be 
necessary to depreciate by a large amount at first and appreciate to 
some extent later. In a portfolio model one can imagine that, e.g., the 
domestic money supply increases. The rate of interest falls and econom-
ie agents demand more foreign bonds. This drives the rate of exchange 
up, improving the current account in the process. The supply of foreign 
bonds increases and the rate of exchange will fall again. Finally, 
Dornbusch has developed a model in which a change in the money supply 
results in overshooting because of sticky prices in the short term. In 
the long run an increase in the money supply will push both the domest-
ic price level and the rate of exchange up. In the short term prices do 
not rise and the interest rate falls as a result of the increased money 
supply. Dornbusch assumes interest rate parity. A lower domestic inter-
est rate involves a premium for the domestic currency on the forward 
market. Given the expected depreciation, a premium can only occur if 
the domestic currency initially depreciates beyond its future equili-
brium rate. Note that rational expectations are assumed: investors are 
certain about the effect of the increased money supply on the domestic 
price level and the future equilibrium exchange rate. 
Attempts to explain the turbulent exchange rate movements since 1973 
have spawned a plethora of models, many of which provide useful in-
sights in some aspects of real-world phenomena. Many empirical develop-
ments remain baffling, however, such as the gyrations of the dollar. 
29 
IX. EPILOGUE 
It appears that many promising developments are going on within the 
field of monetary theory. They range from further work on basic micro-
economics to attempts at explaining real-world exchange rate movements 
to proposals to change present monetary systems. In the micro-economie 
sphere, there is a continuing struggle to break loose from the Walras-
ian framework, a struggle that arguably now bears some fruit in the 
sense that it provides results that are interesting for the profession 
as a whole rather than only for a small band of insiders. But further 
research is needed before we can answer, e.g., questions such as wheth-
er it is sensible to accept disequilibria in the (Walrasian) money 
market. In the exchange-rate field much interesting work is going on, 
but it may be called somewhat disturbing that a multitude of models is 
built upon what appears like ever-changing sets of ad-hoc assumptions. 
As yet there is no such thing as a common framework. As for subjects 
like crowding out, that is to a large extent a matter of econometrics, 
but much thought has also gone into integrating the government budget 
restriction into the basic IS/LM-raodel. 
If one thing looks certain, it is that in a few years' time a survey 
on monetary theory will have many new developments to point at. 
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